Back to Squawk list
  • 25

Boeing plans 737 MAX aircraft return to service in mid-2020

The Boeing Company informed customers and suppliers on Tuesday that they are currently estimating that the ungrounding of the 737 MAX will begin during mid-2020. ( さらに...

Sort type: [Top] [Newest]

Michael Gower 2
I can't help but think that the long, drawn out process to correct the deficiencies of the MAX 10 are due in large part to the FAA not devoting adequate resources to the matter. The longer the situation drags on, the longer the traveling public and the manufacturer are negatively impacted. Yes, safety is paramount, but how long does it take to correct this if Boeing and the FAA would only admit their roles in the original problem and then work together to get this done?
Brad Littlejohn 2
It was my understanding that the B10M isn't affected by the AOA issues due to the larger CFM engines, as it is a larger fuselage than the B38M and B39M. Granted the stigma of being a MAX will carry, but it was my udnerstanding that because of the larger fuselage, the placement of the engines didn't create the same AOA issue that the B38M and B39M have.
stratofan 4
I agree with your assessment, but if Boeing did rush the intro of the MAX, why did not any problems show up in flight test? No airliner has a completely smooth introduction, but the flight test team is relentless in finding what is right, and what is wrong with an airplane. By the way, MCAS is in the KC46A Pegasus, I am sure that USAF crews would have said something if it did not work. Could it be they are trained thoroughly in using the equipment, and not given a DVD on using the system to save money like I am sure some airlines have done?
Greg S 4
Yes, Boeing rushed the intro of the MAX. Yes, problems did show up in flight testing, that's why they added MCAS. Yes, the KC46A has a system called "MCAS", but it's not the same MCAS that's in the 737 MAX. In at least two absolutely critical ways systems are totally different. 1) The system in the KC46A uses on two sensors. 2) The KC-46A systems defers to the pilot. In KC-46A, if the pilot commands nose-up climb and but the sensors tell MCAS it should push the nose down, the nose goes up. Pilot always wins. Just the opposite is true on the 737 MAX's MCAS. If MCAS thinks the nose should go down then down it will go. If the pilot pulls back on the yoke to push the nose up, MCAS will push it back down using the stabilizer. And no, 737 MAX pilots weren't trained on the operation of MCAS with a DVD. They weren't trained at all, because Boeing said there was no MCAS training needed.
btweston 2
The Pegasus isn’t exactly a shining example of Boeing doing things right. And it is in no way related to the 737.
Frank Harvey 1
Maybe Boeing never test flew the a/c with the Captain's side AOA indicator disabled.

I am under the impression that Boeing's private EMails (recently released by Boeing) include one in which a Boeing test pilot says that he "crashed" several times when he first flew the Simulator. Note also that after some early testing Boeing is said to have significantly increased the trim deflection invoked by MCAS software.

Also note that there were reports that Simulator testing in mid-2019 by "regular airline" pilots resulted in a crash but test pilots were able to recover from the same situation.

I see Boeing's real issue, (as with Volkswagen's Diesel Emissions a few ago), was to use computer software to attempt to circumvent a fact. The 737 Max is aerodynamically a different a/c to earlier 737s. Grossly simplified, Boeing should tell the PF that if you shove power on, the nose goes up and you manually trim to keep it down, if you take power off the nose drops and you re-trim to keep the ASI needle where you want it to be. And forget about paying people $6 or $9 an hour to create fancy computer software to handle the trim when the PF should be capable of doing it himself.
DouglasBoyd Boyd 0


アカウントをお持ちではありませんか? 今すぐ登録(無料)!機能やフライトアラート、その他様々な設定をカスタマイズできます!