The Broward Sheriff’s Office failed to seize control and set up an effective command system after the deadly mass shooting at Fort Lauderdale airport, leading to a cascade of mistakes — some involving the most basic police work, according to the agency’s own draft review of the incident.
Confusion about who was in charge created a free-for-all as more than 2,000 law enforcement officers descended on the airport, their abandoned cars blocking evacuation routes.
The 99-page draft report, written by sheriff’s officials, describes how the agency erred from the very beginning in controlling the shooting scene in the baggage claim area of Terminal 2, where five people died and six others were wounded. The initial failures were compounded as false reports of more gunshots 90 minutes later sent travelers stampeding to the exits and onto the tarmac.
“During the events, the absence of a clearly defined [incident command] created unnecessary entanglements and unclear responsibilities,” the review found.
<!–if lt IE 7
–>
<!–if IE 7
–>
<!–if IE 8
–>
http://interactive.sun-sentinel.com/fl-airport-chaos-audio/js/jquery-1.10.2.min.js
http://interactive.sun-sentinel.com/fl-airport-chaos-audio/js/modernizr.js
In addition to the leadership failures, the report chronicles how the county’s aging radio system buckled under the strain as users spiked from 1,800 to over 3,000 in the minutes immediately after the shooting.
The radio breakdowns were so severe that police missed words and whole phrases of transmissions, and dangerously so. In one example a request to “confirm shots fired” was heard as a declaration: “shots fired.”
Police were forced to improvise, communicating with hand signals, runners and cellphones.
The report found the lack of leadership hindered the initial response and led to later problems, including:
— The crime scene became overrun with police responding from across South Florida. “Their presence, in many cases, obstructed the containment and control of the scene.”
— Witnesses to the shootings were held in a place where they could see the bodies, exposing them to prolonged trauma.They were allowed to discuss the attack, potentially tainting their recollections of what they saw.
— SWAT teams arriving from other agencies did not know where to land their helicopters.
— Some deputies were unfamiliar with the airport’s layout, which caused delays responding to several emergencies.
— Plainclothes and undercover officers, some wearing ski masks, ran through the terminals with their weapons drawn, terrifying passengers and putting themselves at risk of being shot by other officers.
— With so many agencies on scene, it wasn’t clear who was in control.
— Clashes occurred between the Sheriff’s Office and Broward County aviation officials, who the report suggests disregarded or delayed Sheriff’s Office requests or decisions.
The critical report, obtained after a public records request by the Sun Sentinel, underscores the newspaper’s investigation into the response published in April.
In addition to noting its own failings, the Sheriff’s Office reserved some of its harshest criticisms for the aviation department. Among the findings in the report:
— The aviation department “did not immediately understand its role was to support the BSO” incident command.
— The airport failed to follow its own evacuation plan, resulting in a breach of the secure areas in every terminal.
— The aviation department denied access to airport blueprints to SWAT teams trying to sweep and secure the terminals.
— Airport staff moved luggage from Terminal 2 before it was screened for bombs and evidence.
— Travelers stranded for up to 10 hours, including the sickly, were not given food, water or shelter. Challenges in getting county buses to the scene “resulted in extreme delays and medical emergencies.”
Frank Capello, airport security director, said Friday he would not comment on the draft report and was waiting for the aviation department’s own review by an outside consultant.
Sheriff Scott Israel declined to comment through his spokeswoman Veda Coleman-Wright. She said in an email that he had not reviewed the draft and would be briefed once the report is finalized.
In an interview with the Sun Sentinel in April, Israel said: “Everything was done excellently.” He described the situation as “controlled chaos.”
The shooting
The shooting occurred just before 1 p.m. Jan. 6, after police say Esteban Santiago, then 26, picked up a gun in a case that he checked on a one-way flight from Alaska to Fort Lauderdale. Santiago collected the case at a Delta service office, according to the report, before loading the gun in a nearby bathroom. (Initial information from law enforcement in the days after the shooting indicated he retrieved the gun from the baggage claim carousel.)
As Santiago walked from the bathroom through the baggage claim area, he fired 14 rounds. Deputies stationed at the airport raced toward the gunfire and within 85 seconds had weapons pointed at him, rapidly ending the threat. Santiago surrendered.
But by the agency’s own admission, its actions immediately after that — from securing the crime scene to communicating with other agencies as they responded — were marked by disarray.
The report also strongly criticizes the aviation department’s refusal to stop operations in Terminal 2 after the mass shooting, saying authorities “always assume a second attack.” It suggests that aviation officials prioritized revenues over lives.
“Decision-makers must understand the priorities of life vs. the business mindset of revenue loss,” the report says.
The stampede and second wave of panic
Police were in the process of containing the crime scene just as claims of more gunshots — first reported by a U.S. Customs officer — reverberated through all four airport terminals and two parking garages.
Crime scene investigators at the site of the attack were unprepared for this second wave of chaos. A stream of travelers, airport workers and journalists soon overran the area and compromised the crime scene again.
The lack of a well-defined command continued to hamper law enforcement’s effectiveness and laid bare the weaknesses of the disorganized response.
In some cases, officers arriving at the airport didn’t know where to go, so they made decisions on their own. The report again points to the failure to set up a “unified command structure” as well as the poor radio communications.
The flood of officers ditching their cars as they sprinted to the airport also made an “impassible ‘parking lot’ of vehicles” that created obstacles for other officers.
The agency’s 44-foot mobile command vehicle, with radio patching technology and cell and satellite backup systems, was trapped by the hastily parked police cars. The mobile post, which is key to controlling a scene, lost internet and phone access and couldn’t move to a better location.
Going forward
The report notes that despite the communication problems and high tension that lasted longer than 12 hours, law enforcement remained vigilant for additional threats and prevented any further loss of life.
SWAT teams methodically swept through garages, stairwells and terminals, looking for areas that could conceal a second shooter. They found frightened people hiding under cars, in closets and underneath the concourses, patted them down and eventually restored order. Also, authorities worked hard to prevent theft of the many items left behind as passengers ran.
The report’s conclusion strikes almost a humble tone underscored with resolve to do better if this happens again.
“The confusion, chaos and magnitude of the event tested all involved,” the report says. “Mistakes were made, lessons were learned and the self-effacement of key role players carries on, but the path to success always involves a degree of discomfort.”
The reviewers promised that the Jan. 6 shooting would lead to a new era in protecting the Fort Lauderdale airport from a similar threat.
In future events, the Sheriff’s Office should immediately declare itself as the commanding agency for all operations, the review says. It also calls for a formal team of police, fire rescue and emergency management officials to be assigned full time to the airport to plan for and respond to another attack.
It notes that airport leaders and local, state and federal law enforcement were not prepared for such a large-scale incident and must do so in the future. It cites a 2013 shooting at the Los Angeles International Airport as an event that should have led to change but did not.
“Unfortunately, tragic events become forgotten with time,” the report says. “The sense of urgency to react only becomes real when it lands squarely on one’s lap.”
shobbs@sun-sentinel.com, 954-356-4520 or @bystephenhobbs
momatz@sunsentinel.com, 954-356-4518
